## Explanation/Format

For each exercise, assume that the plan text and counterplan text have been read. Craft the best permutation you can against the counterplan. This requires typing out the text of the permutation, providing a theoretical justification for the permutation (potentially including a theoretical indictment of the counterplan), and explaining why the permutation resolves/avoids the net-benefit.

Three reminders:

1. Functional Competition = does the function or mechanism of the counterplan compete with the function or mechanism of the plan?

2. Textual Competition = does the text of the counterplan compete with the text of the plan?

3. Legitimate permutations include all of the plan and all or part of the counterplan. Any other permutation is extremely difficult for the affirmative to win.

## BIT Plan

### Counterplan #1

Plan: The United States federal government should accede to the terms of the US-China bilateral investment accord most-recently advanced by Chinese negotiators.

Counterplan: The United States federal government should offer to accede to the terms of the US-China bilateral investment accord most-recently advanced by Chinese negotiators if and only if the People’s Republic of China agrees to restore its unofficial communication ties with the Republic of China.

Net-Benefit: The CP stops a China-Taiwan war by restoring relations between the PRC and ROC.

Permutation:

Explanation/Theoretical Backing:

### Counterplan #2

Plan: The United States federal government should accede to the terms of the US-China bilateral investment accord most-recently advanced by Chinese negotiators.

Counterplan: The People’s Republic of China should accede to the terms of the US-China bilateral investment accord most-recently advanced by United States negotiators.

Net-Benefit: The CP gets the U.S. a better deal, saving our tech industry and economy.

Permutation:

Explanation/Theoretical Backing:

### Counterplan #3

Plan: The United States federal government should accede to the terms of the US-China bilateral investment accord most-recently advanced by Chinese negotiators.

Counterplan: The United States federal government should threaten to place economic sanctions on Chinese state-owned enterprises accused of violating American intellectual property rights if the People’s Republic of China does not accede to the terms of the US-China bilateral investment accord most-recently advanced by U.S. negotiators.

Net-Benefit: The CP gets China to agree to the U.S.’s terms. That’s better for the U.S. economy.

Permutation:

Explanation/Theoretical Backing:

### Counterplan #4

Plan: The United States federal government should accede to the terms of the US-China bilateral investment accord most-recently advanced by Chinese negotiators.

Counterplan: The United States federal government should accede to nearly all terms of the US-China bilateral investment accord most-recently advanced by Chinese negotiators except it should insist that foreign investments in the United States by Chinese state-owned enterprises continue to be vetted by CFIUS.

Net-Benefit: The plan ends CFIUS review; the CP does not. CFIUS review protects U.S. military secrets. If China obtains more military secrets, they’ll modernize their military and challenge U.S. hegemony in East Asia.

Permutation:

Explanation/Theoretical Backing:

### Counterplan #5

Plan: The United States federal government should accede to the terms of the US-China bilateral investment accord most-recently advanced by Chinese negotiators.

Counterplan: The United States federal government should formally invite the People’s Republic of China to the Trans-Pacific Partnership. If China agrees to join the TPP, the United States federal government should accede to nearly all terms of the US-China bilateral investment accord most-recently advanced by Chinese negotiators except for those that conflict with the terms of the TPP.

Net-Benefit: The plan convinces China to join the TPP. Agreeing to a BIT on China’s terms before China joins the TPP makes it unlikely that they will join. Chinese membership in the TPP is key to U.S. economic leadership in Asia.

Permutation:

Explanation/Theoretical Backing:

### Counterplan #6

Plan: The United States federal government should accede to the terms of the US-China bilateral investment accord most-recently advanced by Chinese negotiators.

Counterplan: The United States Trade Representative should instruct United States negotiators to accede to the terms of the US-China bilateral investment accord most-recently advanced by Chinese negotiators on November 3rd, 2016.

Net-Benefit: The counterplan doesn’t accede to China’s terms until after the election, avoiding the Election DA.

Permutation:

Explanation/Theoretical Backing:

### Counterplan #7

Plan: The United States federal government should accede to the terms of the US-China bilateral investment accord most-recently advanced by Chinese negotiators.

Counterplan: The United States federal government should appoint a blue ribbon commission of private sector experts selected by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to evaluate the terms of the US-China bilateral investment accord most-recently advanced by Chinese negotiators. The commission should be provided with access to all relevant documents and should be required to submit a report detailing its recommendations for further negotiations to the United States Trade Representative no earlier than November 3rd, 2016 and no later than November 4th, 2016. Unless the commission’s recommendations suggest that the United States should not negotiate a bilateral investment accord with the People’s Republic of China, the United States federal government should accede to the terms of the US-China bilateral investment accord most-recently advanced by Chinese negotiators.

Net-Benefit: The counterplan delays the plan until after the election, avoiding the Election DA. It will definitely pass the plan because the Chamber of Commerce supports a BIT.

Permutation:

Explanation/Theoretical Backing:

### Counterplan #8

Plan: The United States federal government should accede to the terms of the US-China bilateral investment accord most-recently advanced by Chinese negotiators.

Counterplan: The President of the United States should sign the US-China bilateral investment accord most-recently advanced by Chinese negotiators. The United States Congress should pass the US-China bilateral investment accord. The President of the United States should veto the US-China bilateral investment accord. The United States Congress should override the President’s veto.

Net-Benefit: The counterplan is a huge loss for Obama, derailing his ability to push Merrick Garland’s nomination through the Senate during the lame duck session. Clinton will win and appoint a more liberal justice that upholds gun control.

Permutation:

Explanation/Theoretical Backing:

## Taiwan Plan

### Counterplan #9

Plan: The United States federal government should negotiate a grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China by offering to end its commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression in return for China peacefully resolving its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas and officially accepting the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia.

Counterplan: The United States federal government should engage in prior binding consultation with Japan over whether the United States should negotiate a grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China by offering to end its commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression in return for China peacefully resolving its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas and officially accepting the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia. Unless Japan objects, the United States federal government should negotiate a grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China by offering to end its commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression in return for China peacefully resolving its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas and officially accepting the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia.

Net-Benefit: Consultation with Japan strengthens the U.S.-Japan alliance. It’s key to peace and security in East Asia.

Permutation:

Explanation/Theoretical Backing:

### Counterplan #10

Plan: The United States federal government should negotiate a grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China by offering to end its commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression in return for China peacefully resolving its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas and officially accepting the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia.

Counterplan: The United States Secretary of State should secretly negotiate a grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China by offering to end the United States’ commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression in return for China peacefully resolving its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas and officially accepting the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia.

Net-Benefit: Secret State Department negotiations avoid political and allied backlash if China says no. If China says yes, the counterplan results in the same policy as the plan.

Permutation:

Explanation/Theoretical Backing:

### Counterplan #11

Plan: The United States federal government should negotiate a grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China by offering to end its commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression in return for China peacefully resolving its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas and officially accepting the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia.

Counterplan: The United States federal government should negotiate a grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China by offering to end its commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression in return for China peacefully resolving its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas via an independent third party arbitration system not governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and officially accepting the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia.

Net-Benefit: The plan sends a signal of U.S. support of UNCLOS/LOST. The counterplan does not. UNCLOS/LOST is bad because it undermines the U.S. military’s freedom of navigation.

Permutation:

Explanation/Theoretical Backing:

### Counterplan #12

Plan: The United States federal government should negotiate a grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China by offering to end its commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression in return for China peacefully resolving its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas and officially accepting the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia.

Counterplan: The United States federal government should negotiate a multilateral grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China and Japan by offering to end the United States’ commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression in return for China peacefully resolving its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas via an independent third party arbitration system not governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and officially accepting the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia.

Net-Benefit: Japan will feel abandoned by the plan, but they’re involved in the negotiations of the counterplan. This preserves the U.S.-Japan Alliance.

Permutation:

Explanation/Theoretical Backing:

### Counterplan #13

Plan: The United States federal government should negotiate a grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China by offering to end its commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression in return for China peacefully resolving its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas and officially accepting the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia.

Counterplan: The 45th President of the United States should negotiate a grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China by offering to end its commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression in return for China peacefully resolving its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas and officially accepting the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia.

Net-Benefit: The next President does the counterplan, so it avoids the Election DA.

Permutation:

Explanation/Theoretical Backing:

### Counterplan #14

Plan: The United States federal government should negotiate a grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China by offering to end its commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression in return for China peacefully resolving its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas and officially accepting the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia.

Counterplan: The 45th President of the United States should negotiate a strategic agreement with the People’s Republic of China by offering to end its commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression in return for China peacefully resolving its territorial disputes in the South China and East China Seas and officially accepting the long-term military security role of the United States in East Asia.

Net-Benefit: The next President does the counterplan, so it avoids the Election DA.

Permutation:

Explanation/Theoretical Backing:

### Counterplan #15

Plan: The United States federal government should negotiate a grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China by offering to end its commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression in return for China peacefully resolving its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas and officially accepting the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia.

Counterplan: The United States federal government should negotiate a grand bargain with the Chinese Communist Party government headquartered in Beijing by offering to end its commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese Communist Party aggression in return for the Chinese Communist Party peacefully resolving its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas and officially accepting the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia.

Net-Benefit: “People’s Republic of China” is a euphemism that conceals authoritarian violence. The counterplan doesn’t use that term.

Permutation:

Explanation/Theoretical Backing:

### Counterplan #16

Plan: The United States federal government should negotiate a grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China by offering to end its commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression in return for China peacefully resolving its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas and officially accepting the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia.

Counterplan: The United States federal government should negotiate a grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China by threatening to normalize its relations with and substantially increase its arms sales to Taiwan if China does not agree to peacefully resolve its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas and officially accept the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia in exchange for the United States ending its commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression.

Net-Benefit: The counterplan threatens China, forcing them to say “yes.” If China says no, the counterplan is a much stronger deterrent.

Permutation:

Explanation/Theoretical Backing: